



# How to provide security fixes in a high constraint ecosystem?

Practical examples with the Jenkins project



# What is the general context?



## Jenkins and you

- Do you know Jenkins?
- Do you use Jenkins in your company?
- Do you administer an instance yourself?
- Do you apply security update when they are released?
  - Have you subscribed to the security advisory mailing list?
  - [jenkinsci-advisories@googlegroups.com](mailto:jenkinsci-advisories@googlegroups.com)



## Jenkins and me

- Member of the Jenkins Security team
- Security software engineer at CloudBees
- Daily tasks:
  - Providing security fixes
  - Detecting vulnerabilities and preventing them
  - Reviewing internal design / implementations
  - Improve security awareness / education
  - Helping support about security topics



## The Jenkins project

- Most popular CI/CD tool on the market
- Open-source
- Over 1.7 Million users
- ~1500 plugins
- Integrated with most of the tools
  - Missing an integration? You can write your own plugin easily





## Jenkins...

- Is a remote execution engine
  - build your project, execute scripts, etc.
- Has access to sensitive data
  - credentials, secrets, source code, artifacts, etc.
- Is a multi-user service
  - various kind of users with different expertise





## Main security objectives (1)

- Prevent intrusion
- Secure your data
- Avoid privilege escalation
- Enforce best practices





## Main security objectives (2)

- Do not break your instance on security update
  - Update *ASAP* when a security advisory is published





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NEWS

### Hackers exploit Jenkins servers, make \$3 million by mining Monero

Hackers exploiting Jenkins servers made \$3 million in one of the biggest malicious cryptocurrency mining operations ever.

Monero turns Jenkins servers into mining slaves

The hip world of continuous integration meets the

Jenkins Miner: One of the biggest mining operations ever discovered

Biggest Crypto Hacking Operation Ever Uncovered



## Main security objectives (3)

- About the attack
  - Discovered in February **2018**



## Main security objectives (3)

- About the attack
  - Discovered in February 2018
  - Patch was released in April 2017





# What the security team does

- [jenkins.io/security/advisories](https://jenkins.io/security/advisories)

## Security Advisories

This page lists all security advisories that have been published so far.

### 2018

- [Jenkins Security Advisory 2018-10-29](#)
  - Affects Plugins: Pipeline: Groovy Script Security
- [Jenkins Security Advisory 2018-10-10](#)
  - Affects Jenkins Core
- [Jenkins Security Advisory 2018-09-25](#)
  - Affects Plugins: Arachni Scanner Argus Notifier Artifactory Chatter Notifier Config File Provider Crowd ; Git Changelog HipChat JIRA Job Configuration History JUnit mesos Metadata Monitoring MQ Notifier SonarQube Scanner
- [Jenkins Security Advisory 2018-08-15](#)
  - Affects Jenkins Core
- [Jenkins Security Advisory 2018-07-30](#)
  - Affects Plugins: AccuRev Agiletestware Pangolin Connector for TestRail Anchore Container Image Scann Inedo ProGet Plugin Kubernetes Maven Artifact ChoiceListProvider (Nexus) meliora-testlab Publish Ovs SSH Agent Tinfoil Security TraceTronic ECU-TEST
- [Jenkins Security Advisory 2018-07-18](#)
  - Affects Jenkins Core
- [Jenkins Security Advisory 2018-06-25](#)
  - Affects Plugins: AWS CodeBuild AWS CodeDeploy AWS CodePipeline Badge CollabNet Plugins Confi IBM z/OS Connector OpenStack Cloud SAML SSH Credentials URLTrigger
- [Jenkins Security Advisory 2018-06-04](#)
  - Affects Plugins: AbsInt Astrée Black Duck Detect Black Duck Hub CAS Git GitHub GitHub Branch Sou
- [Jenkins Security Advisory 2018-05-09](#)
  - Affects Jenkins Core
  - Affects Plugins: Black Duck Hub Gitlab Hook Groovy Postbuild
- [Jenkins Security Advisory 2018-04-16](#)
  - Affects Plugins: Email Extension Google Login HTML Publisher S3 publisher
- [Jenkins Security Advisory 2018-04-11](#)
  - Affects Jenkins Core
- [Jenkins Security Advisory 2018-03-26](#)
  - Affects Plugins: Ansible Copy To Slave Cucumber Living Documentation GitHub Pull Request Builder Liq
- [Jenkins Security Advisory 2018-02-26](#)
  - Affects Plugins: Azure Slave Coverity CppNCSS Environment Injector Gerrit Trigger Git Google Play Ai promoted builds Subversion TestLink
- [Jenkins Security Advisory 2018-02-14](#)
  - Affects Jenkins Core
- [Jenkins Security Advisory 2018-02-05](#)
  - Affects Plugins: Android Lint CCM Credentials Binding JUnit Pipeline: Supporting APIs
- [Jenkins Security Advisory 2018-01-22](#)
  - Affects Plugins: Ant Checkstyle DRY FindBugs Pipeline: Nodes and Processes PMD Release Transla



## Best practices

- Principle of least privilege
- Use different credentials
- Avoid running build on master
- Take care of the security warnings



# What are the constraints?



## Constraints for a security fix (1)

- Keep backward binary compatibility
- Confidential aspect of the security discovery until fixed
- Cannot fix only one plugin if the vulnerability is generalized in multiple plugins



## Constraints for a security fix (2)

- Some vulnerabilities require structural change
- Multiple long term support versions in our commercial offering
- How to deal with features dangerous by design
- Time constraints due to disclosure policy





## Constraints from community aspect

- Open-source community
- Private plugins
- Broad plugin ecosystem
- No common coding practice among plugins
  - Maintainers are not always Java developers
- Some plugins are not maintained
- Sync with maintainers for security release



## Constraints from project (started in 2004)

- File system as storage by default
- Legacy parts kept for compatibility
- Lots of knowledge required to avoid breaking stuff



# Our approach to tackle those problems



## General process to handle reports

- Vulnerability reported in our private tracker
- Reproduce the problem
- Determine the impact / severity
- Correct the behavior
  - Either the plugin maintainer
  - Or a security team member (esp. for core)
- Review by the security team
- Synchronization for the next security release



## Issue tracking

- Process: [jenkins.io/security/](https://jenkins.io/security/)
- Private project part of the public Jira
- Members of security team have full access
- Reporter and assignee have access to their issue



## Developer education

- Improve security awareness
  - Inside community / company
  - Using documentation / best practices / talks
- Code review



Like today!



## Vulnerabilities prioritisation

- Common vulnerability scoring system (CVSS)
- Popularity of the plugin (# of installations)
- Difficulty of the correction (potential breakage)
  
- Discussion inside the Jenkins security team



## Plugin blacklisting

- Plugin with dangerous features
- Not easily fixed
- Could be temporary or permanent





## Reduce the risk to break instances

- We ask the administrators to upgrade ASAP
- We cannot break their instance
- Requirement to deliver high quality code
  - Small amount of review
  - Keep changes as small as possible



## Up-merge and non-regression

- Multiple LTS lines for CloudBees customers only
- Non-regression tests are very useful to detect conflicts




# Our tools to ease our job



## Plugin compatibility tester (PCT) to reduce risks

- Before release a security fix
- Ensure compatibility with the different core versions
  - No recompilation
  - Tests must pass





## @Restricted annotation (1)

- `public` modifier in Java
- Open API for other plugins
- Jenkins requires some cases to be `public`
  - @Extension classes
  - Form validation
- @Restricted(NoExternalUse.class)
  - Enforce other plugins are not using that code





## @Restricted annotation (2)

- Allow developer to limit their exposed API
- Reduce the risk of breaking backward compatibility
- Avoid call to methods in unintended ways / state





## Default configuration for fresh / upgrade

- Existing behavior / configuration is not safe
- We add a new one that is secure
  - On fresh installation, enabled by default
  - On upgrade, we must keep the legacy behavior



## Administrative monitors

- When a feature configuration is potentially dangerous
  - Display a message to the administrators
  - When possible, actionable buttons
- Ease migration from existing configuration





## Escape hatches

- If the legacy / dangerous behavior was expected
- Administrators could use some system property flags to keep the legacy behavior at their own risk
- Implication of such configuration is explained in the security advisory



# Telemetry

- Improve anonymous usage statistics
- Currently used to detect the unused escape hatches
- Could be used in the future to help understanding real usage of certain features



## Custom scripts to search code

- During vulnerability correction
  - We need to ensure no other plugins are sharing code
  - Search for code similarities
- Avoid publishing an advisory that will disclose other vulnerabilities
- Unfortunately not possible for closed-source plugin
  - Incentive for code sharing!



## API plugin

- Special kind of plugin that contain only a library
- Avoid upgrading the version in every plugin
- Esp. useful for libraries with active security research
- Examples:
  - Bouncy Castle
  - Jackson



## Setup Wizard

- Ease the initial configuration
- Secure by default
- Enforce best practices





## Secret class (1)

- Allow developers to store sensible information
- Easy migration from previously plain text (`String`)
- No cryptography knowledge required





## Secret class (2)

- Do you use `Cipher.getInstance("AES")` ?
- Default mode on Oracle JVM: ECB






# Practical examples





## API Token (1)


- Previous version:
  - Data was stored in encrypted form on disk
  - Was possible to recover the token value
  - Only one token per user





## API Token (2)

- New version:
  - Multiple tokens per user
  - Only the hash is stored
  - Possibility to revoke token individually
  - Easy migration





# XML deserialization (1)

- XML External Entity (XXE)
  - If the parser is not safely configured

```
setFeature("http://xml.org/sax/features/external-general-entities", false);  
setFeature("http://xml.org/sax/features/external-parameter-entities", false);  
[+ other depending on the library]
```

- Deserialization
  - URL to generate DNS requests
  - ysoserial



## XML deserialization (2)

- Java deserialization could be very dangerous
- Initially we blacklisted the dangerous classes
- Too many reports
- Migrate to a whitelist pattern that is more secure



# Script sandboxing

- Reduce scripting capacity
- Script approval
- Using a whitelist
  - Methods / fields the administrators pre-approve





## Conclusion

- Apply the updates!
- Ease update process
- Beware of unsecured default settings
- Most of your users are not sufficiently “educated”

